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TOWARD A THEORY OF IDEALOGICAL INVOLVEMENT: AN EXPLORATION OF THE CAUSES AND FUNCTIONS OF DEVIANT POLITICAL BEHAVIOR IN THE AMERICAN POLITY

by

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APPROVED

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A THESIS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page

I. SOME PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL INQUIRY 9

The Problem 9
Sources of Distortion 21
Social Sources. 30
Pathology Scholarship 35

II. THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR. 42

Epistemic Requirements. 42
A Model of Development. 47
Motivation. 50
Skinner's Critique. 53
Motivational Structure, Operation and Acquisition 57
A Typology. 76
Motives: Aggregation of Needs. 89
Scarcity. 92
Distribution. 98
Efficiency and Rationality. 104
The Problem of Calculating Profit 112
The Laws of Human Exchange. 118
Modification: The Way to Profit. 124
The Functional Personality. 128
Learning. 133
Enlarging the Outcomes. 137
Learning and Discrimination 148
Social Learning 158

Chapter Page

III. A CYBERNETIC MODEL OF PERSONALITY 164

The Conjunction of Personal and Social Functions 164
Cognitive Structure and Function. 169
Skill Trait Structure and Function. 193
Ego Structure and Function. 203
Development and Socialization 211
General Stage I 213
General Stage II. 215
General Stage III 227
General Stage IV. 238
Psychodynamic Integration: A Theory of Fit. 247
The Danger of Normative Psychology. 249
Conflict: External and Internal. 263
Conflict Management 267

IV. THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 281

Elementary Behavior 281
Status: Elementary and Aggregate 283
Micropolitics 288
Hierarchy and Authority 290
Democracy and Influence 295
The Problem of Interaction. 297
Manipulative Stratagems 301
Aggregate Behavior. 316
Role System and Management. 320
The Bifurcation of Culture. 325
Primary and Secondary Functions 332
Evolution 345
Social Development Through Time 354
Political Change. 363
Intra-aggregate Behavior. 370

V. TOWARD A THEORY OF IDEALOGICAL BEHAVIOR . . . 374

Idealogical Behavior. 377
The Continuum of Political Behavior 381

Page

A Model in the First Approximation. 392
A Model in the Second Approximation 426
Summary 448
A Theory of Leadership. 453
General Leadership Factors. 457
Specialized Leadership Factors. 463

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 467

APPENDIX. 477

DEDICATION

To June

CHAPTER I

SOME PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL INQUIRY

The Problem

The central purpose of this work is to construct, and to a second approximation verify, a theory of idealogical involvement. Idealogical refers to behavior based exclusively on the demands of a political myth rather than the model of a real politik. The basic problem in achieving an account of such behavior lies in the absence of a verified theory of human behavior from which a model might confidently be drawn. Thus, the first task is the construction of an integrated theory of human behavior. However, even before a theory can be conceptualized, certain methodological strictures must be advanced, especially those that affect the course of scientific inquiry generally.

According to Victor Lenzen, "The problem of empirical science is the acquisition and systematization of knowledge concerning the things and phenomena experienced in observation."[1] In general, the problem of empirical science is but a special case of a more universal problem faced by all men: that of bridging the everpresent cognitive gap between what is known and what must be known in order to survive in a hostile and indifferent physical and social environment. The central assumption of this instrumental view of knowledge is that man is a value seeking being, and that whatever the values men seek, they cannot be acquired in the absence of relatively accurate knowledge of reality. But acquiring accurate knowledge of reality is seriously complicated by the existence of a permanent, unbreachable partition that separates the observer from the observed. Reality cannot be known directly or immediately, but it can be approximated by symbolic representation. The universal technique evolved by man to approximate reality is the cognitive belief system; a kind of portable, quickly retrievable, model of reality sufficiently accurate to ensure relatively safe operations on the environment. The function of a belief system is to provide a useful approximation of reality--the level of sophistication of the belief system depends upon the complexity of the environment in which it is to be used. Thus, the first problem of knowledge is that reality cannot be known, only approximated; the second problem of knowledge centers on the adequacy of the cognitive instruments, belief systems, to actually represent reality. The first problem is given; the second will be the central preoccupation of this chapter.

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[1] Victor F. Lenzen, "Procedures of Empirical Science," International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, I, No. 5 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), 1.

There are three kinds of scientific belief systems employed in scientific inquiry, each of which is derived from a significant psychological construct universal to all human cognitive activity. To put it another way, there exists in the mind of each human being a set of functionally relevant psychological belief systems, and each of these is a model for one of the technical instruments of social inquiry. The three instruments are:

epistemology df a metaphysical (or metasocial) world view consisting of sets of primitive, untestable, analytic *a priori* propositions that define the purpose of knowledge, relevant units of analysis and observation, and the initial classifications and relationships that organize the elements of reality meaningfully.

theory df a logically consistent set of general laws, couched in analytic _a priori_ language, that state universal, though conditional relationships between the constructs which stand in the place of real objects. Ideally, a theory is derived through logical deduction from the set of postulates advanced by the epistemology. A model is a working representation of a theory capable of generating testable propositions implicit in the theory, but not obvious. The general laws of a theory become hypotheses the moment the analytic constructs are replaced by operational definitions and measuring instruments. At this point they become synthetic and testable.

methodology df a set of authoritative criteria defining the legitimate procedures of observation and the tests for adopting or rejecting hypotheses (logic, mathematics, statistics, and the procedures of empirical science). Methodology defines the truth value of a theory by validating or rejecting the hypotheses derived from the theory: ordinarily, truth is defined as the correspondence of the data to the relationships hypothesized by the theory.

An epistemology is the scientific equivalent of a primitive belief at the individual, subjective level; a theory is equal to an empirical model of reality; a methodology is coextensive with the personal procedures employed in evaluating the truth of propositions. The function of a primitive belief system for an individual personality is to provide stability and preserve the internal integrity of the organism by interpreting the place of self in reality, establishment of identity as a social being, and the internalization of some of the moral precepts articulated in his family situation. Primitive beliefs are unquestioned postulates, both moral and non-moral, that are taken as absolute statements describing the nature of goodness, truth and beauty, the nature of man, society, government, physical reality, time and space, change, the self, including idealizations about how things ought to be. The function of a model of empirical reality is adjustment to situational demands in order to facilitate the efficient acquisition of values. In content, the models are complex symbolic representations of the objects of reality and the dynamic interactions between them. A methodology could be either a part of an empirical model or a primitive belief system. Indeed, there is much evidence for the assertion, which will be examined in a later chapter, that commitment to scientific method is as absolute and irrational as commitment to any set of political or religious doctrines. As such, scientific method may be classified as an epistemology or as a primitive belief for those who observe it religiously. Each of these cognitive instruments plays a significant role in the total process of developing and improving approximations of reality, but epistemology is decisive because it provides the cast into which both theory and methodology are poured. In effect, it provides that necessary, initial ordering of reality that permits observation (meaningful perception) in the first instance and becomes the basis for all later theoretical refinements in the second. Without an epistemology to order it, reality would be nothing more than an ambiguous conglomeration of random stimuli, totally devoid of meaning or significance to the observer. An epistemology determines what questions will be asked of reality; as I hope to show later, the questions determine the general framework of the answers.

The aging philosophical dispute concerning the disjunction between analytic and synthetic proposition is drawn into sharp focus here. If it is true, as A. J. Ayers argues,[2] that each is an exclusive class of propositions, verifiable by different rules of evidence, then we must draw a hard line between epistemology and theory on the one hand, and testable hypotheses on the other. According to Ayer, "a proposition is analytic when its validity depends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contains and synthetic when its validity is determined by the facts of experience."[3] There is, however, some confusion over the content of statements in each category. Carnap argues that some analytic propositions are descriptive.[4] In a sense, they resemble synthetic propositions because they deal with empirically defined constructs, even though in terms of verification, their validity depends on the definitions of the empirical constructs rather than upon the correspondence of data to the relationship predicted by the proposition. Until a construct has been invested with the empirical concreteness of an operational definition, it remains an element of an analytic proposition. Thus, Ayer's proposition that no statement is meaningful unless it is empirically verifiable, while it describes the concrete elements of an empirical system of analysis and the criteria for including and excluding statements from each of the categories, is nevertheless analytic, or true by definition. It has the property of being both descriptive and analytic. Employing Ayer's own proposition to classify his statement, the description becomes "meaningless."

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[2] Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover Press, 1946).

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[3] Ibid., p. 78.

[4] Rudolph Carnap, "Formal and Factual Science," Readings in the Philosophy of Science, ed. Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), pp. 123-128.

If we examine the psychological functions of the various belief systems discussed, we discover that the process of developing knowledge is a unified one containing a time dimension which most philosophical disputes tend to ignore. If we accept the proposition that no two events can occupy the same space at the same time, then we must also assume that analytic and synthetic propositions occur empirically in sequences--they never occur simultaneously. If they do not occur simultaneously, we may hypothesize that they are functionally related. Far from being mutually exclusive classes, they represent functionally interdependent classes critical to the development of knowledge. The process of creating knowledge begins with a selective sample of the events of reality from which analytic propositions are derived through induction. From these epistemological summaries of subjective experience, general laws are derived deductively which posit hypothetical relationships between events and objects. Through the arbitrary substitution of operational definitions for the analytic constructs of the general laws, testable synthetic hypotheses are generated. It is the operational definition that makes it possible to reduce hypothetical constructs to the empirical language of observables. If a hypothesis makes a prediction, it becomes synthetic. The arbitrary character of the substitution points up the substantially arbitrary nature of science, and, in fact, all knowledge. Suffice it to assert that the process of developing knowledge has a time sequence, making analytic and synthetic propositions of equal significance to the development process, even though they enter the process at different times and are connected in a perfectly arbitrary manner. This view, incidentally, is consistent with the idea of an observer-observed partition: the synthetic proposition is the closest approximation of reality, and the analytic proposition the farthest. Thus, no statement is synthetic unless it is couched in operational language and is constructed in a way that would require empirical verification. However, abstract statements lacking the concreteness of operational definitions, even though they may be stated in a way that would require empirical verification, are still analytic. This interpretation of the significance and role of synthetic and analytic propositions for scientific inquiry is very much akin to the "theoretic-empirical import" criteria of adequacy advanced by Carl Hempel. According to Hempel,

> Notwithstanding the soundness of the insistence on operational interpretation for scientific terms, it must not be forgotten that good scientific constructs must also possess theoretical, or systematic, import; i.e., they must permit the establishment of explanatory and predictive principles in the form of general laws or theories.[5]

In effect, theory is meaningless without the verification of data, and data is meaningless without the interpretation of theory. Thus, the analytic and synthetic components of scientific inquiry seem to be inextricably linked. The function of an epistemology is to make theory possible; the function of a theory is to generate testable hypotheses and relate the findings of scientific inquiry to one another in a systematic, meaningful way; the function of a hypothesis is to produce an accurate representation of reality at the brink of the observer-observed partition, and, where possible, to feed this information back in order to refine the accuracy of the theory. The continual interplay between theory and hypothesis leads to increasingly more accurate approximations of reality.[6] The relationships elaborated here can be summarized as follows:

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[5] Carl Hempel, "Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science," International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, II, No. 7 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), 45-46.

Figure 1.1



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[6] For a classic discussion of the method of successive approximation, see Lenzen, pp. 41-44.

The central problem of knowledge stems from the relatively imperfect cognitive instruments employed by human beings to approximate reality. Not only are belief systems important in organizing reality in a meaningful way, but they tend to structure the way reality is perceived. The symbols, the meanings assigned to them, the propositions linking them, the syllogistic interactions that generate discoveries, all structure the questions asked of reality. In order to observe reality, some initial instruments are necessary, and the character of these instruments influence what is seen. If the instruments of observation are biased, incomplete or inaccurate, the quality of what is observed will be automatically, though unintentionally distorted. Since the goal of all inquiry seems to be development of better approximations of reality, it must be assumed that the initial instruments upon which inquiry is based are inherently errant. Only through successive inquiry, in which the results of existing knowledge are fed back to correct the original instruments, is there any real hope of reaching accurate approximations. The original and successive instruments employed in scientific investigation are bound to carry some bias, but the assumption of scientific method is that the distortion incurred through the use of these cognitive instruments can be gradually reduced through successive approximation. Since the use of knowledge is basically pragmatic, it seems doubtful that men will ever be motivated to know everything about reality. Consequently, probabilities are high that reality, in most instances, will never be completely approximated. It is equally obvious that the greatest degree of distortion should always occur in the earliest stages of inquiry.

Sources of Distortion

The sources of cognitive distortion fall into two broad categories: natural and social. The natural include those growing out of the inability of any single human being to adequately comprehend or observe the inherent complexity of his social and physical world: (1) the effect of treating complex phenomena simply, (2) the principle of relativity, (3) the problem of indeterminancy, (4) the effects of multiple causation, and (5) the natural decay of knowledge resulting from continual evolution in reality. The social encompass those inherent in the learning and exchange processes of society: (1) the narrowing effects of socialization on content of belief systems, and (2) the fossilization of knowledge due to the institutionalization of competing knowledge claims (epistemologies, theories and methodologies).

The distortions implicit in treating complex phenomena simply. The principle of parsimony represents the scientific formalization of the universal human disposition to think reductively. Reductionism is a natural manifestation of the difficulties human beings encounter in understanding reality, not the least of which is an inability to handle a large number of variables simultaneously. It turns out to be an invaluable tool for introducing efficiency into the process of analysis by limiting the number of variables to be manipulated. Quite often, however, this natural proclivity to simplify is uncontrolled, with the invariable result that reality is rendered less and less complex. In the long-run, the cumulative development of science proves that the more complex representations endure longest and become building blocks for increasingly complex approximations of reality. The latent distortion of reductionism is continually reinforced by the fact that the process of generating knowledge necessarily begins with simple, epistemological notions. Thus, the short-run effect of reductionism is to simplify simplicity. What is necessary for a subjective understanding of reality in the short-run turns out, when indiscriminately applied to a consensual or objective view of reality, to be dysfunctional.

The principle of relativity. Succinctly stated, the principle of relativity holds that what is observed depends very much upon the frame of reference occupied by the observer. Because a person may occupy one and only one spatial frame of reference at any one time, he may observe one and only one simple event, or a single parameter of a complex event. He is, thus, automatically excluded from observation of equally important events or parameters of events. Any change in his frame of reference, such as becoming President after being a United States Senator, may even produce a marked change in his perception of similar events.[7] Even if events were exactly repeatable, a proposition that would presuppose reversibility of time and deny the concept of evolution, there would be little or no assurance that a single observer could have the opportunity of observing them from every relevant point of reference. When another observer is introduced, the probability of error increases because of the difficulties in achieving consensus among persons who may not agree.

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[7] "It is a tremendous change to go from being a Senator to being President. In the first months, it is very difficult. The fact is, I think, the Congress looks more powerful sitting here than it did when I was there in the Congress. But that is because when you are in Congress you are one of a hundred in the Senate and one of 435 in the House. So that the power is so divided. But from here I look at a Congress, and I look at the collective power of the Congress, particularly the bloc action, and it is a substantial power." John F. Kennedy, "President John F. Kennedy Discusses the Presidency," The Dynamics of the American Presidency, ed. Donald Johnson and Jack Walker (New York: John Wiley and Son, 1964), p. 144.

The principle of indeterminancy. For the moment the concept of indeterminancy will be limited to the effects on behavior of measuring behavior. Limiting his focus to subatomic physics, Heisenberg states:

> The interaction between observer and object causes uncontrollable and large changes in the system being observed, because of the discontinuous character of atomic processes. The immediate consequence of this circumstance is that in general every experiment performed to determine some numerical quantity renders the knowledge of others illusory, since the uncontrollable perturbations of the observed system alters the values of previously determined quantities.[8]

While it is admittedly risky to generalize from the physical to the social sciences, there are three prominent instances of the indeterminancy principle in the social sciences: (a) the effect of attitude scales on the spontaneous creation of opinion, (b) the elicitation of manipulative responses by the mere presentation of an attitude instrument, (c) the effect of findings in the field of administrative behavior on the subsequent practice of decision-making. One of the most unsettling attributes of an attitude scale is its ability to generate an opinion spontaneously instead of measuring the intensity with which an existing opinion is held. For example, X may have no opinion on American involvement in Vietnam, but when he is presented with an attitude schedule containing a Vietnam item, he may well be reminded that he has a civic duty to have an opinion, and as a result, he may make a "snap" decision by generalizing from a previous stand on an analogous issue, say the Korean war. The act of affirming an opinion may be sufficient to implant it permanently, perhaps altering some of the parameters of interaction affecting a multiplicity of social outcomes. Another serious problem faced by social scientists is the ability of respondents to manage the instruments presented, either by manipulation or frivolous and random responses. The mere presentation of an instrument designed to induce people to reveal their innermost thoughts can be sufficient to trigger manipulative or set responses. Finally, there is the familiar event of a potential respondent who alters his behavior under observation on the basis of findings of the behavioral sciences. By meeting expectations he continually confirms the adequacy, reliability and validity of both the measuring instruments and the theoretical framework they are designed to test. President Kennedy's decisions on the Bay of Pigs Invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis bear a remarkable resemblance to the decisional scheme advanced in 1958 by Snyder and Paige in their analysis of the American decision to fight in Korea.[9] It is almost as if Kennedy and his staff had used the Snyder-Paige scheme as a decisional blueprint. Other decisional systems and processes undoubtedly exist, but the danger is high that a particular type which bears the stamp of authoritative knowledge because it has been studied in greater depth will eliminate the types not studied. Under such conditions, subsequent investigation would tend to verify the adequacy of the original decisional system as a universal type.

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[8] Werner Heisenberg, The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), p. 3.

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[9] Richard Snyder and Glenn Paige, "The United States Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea: The Application of an Analytical Scheme," Administrative Science Quarterly, III (1958), 341-378.

The effects of multiple causation. Confinement to a single frame of reference at a time effectively shields from view all relevant variables except the one under investigation. Herbert Feigl warns that "In most of the practically significant applications we must remember that it is an entire set of conditions that represents 'the' cause of an event."[10] Multiple causation is a definite requirement for explanatory and predictive accuracy in the social sciences because of the empirically enormous volume of stimuli, or variables, that might in some way impinge upon a specific outcome or effect. The greater the number of variables involved in the calculus of an outcome, the more difficult it becomes for any human being to observe and comprehend the dynamic, longitudinal process of which the outcome is a result. The human inability to deal with a large number of nearly simultaneous, highly interrelated interactions requires imposition of as many controls as possible and elimination of as many variables as possible in advance of the execution of research. The classical experiment, by eliminating through control all variables except the one believed to be the cause of the phenomena under investigation, carries the substantial risk of falsifying the natural order of relationships and obscuring the internal dynamic of the process or disrupting it.[11]

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[10] Herbert Feigl, "Notes on Causality," in Feigl and Brodbeck, p. 410.

The natural decay of knowledge resulting from the continual evolution of reality. The idea that the effects of physical and social or biological change are cumulative introduces an instability in the real world which calls forth the need, not only for more refined discriminations, but also for an approach to knowledge that makes truth an unfinished business. If the reality of the present is, in some sense, new, that is to say, different from the reality of previous time periods, then the knowledge gained about previous historical states of any system may be obsolete when generalized to the present, and totally mistaken when extrapolated to the future. Static or mechanistic theories of behavior, under these conditions, are scientifically inappropriate. Evolution assumes not only that time is irreversible, but that reality itself may lack completely continuous and constant properties. As a result, all scientific theories require probabilistic treatment. Norbert Wiener's illuminating comparison of Newtonian and Bergsonian time provides two interesting and informative examples. According to Wiener, astronomy most closely approximates the static, mechanical, reversible Newtonian paradigm, although it is not a perfect approximation because of the continuous expansion of the universe. Planets are "very nearly points," relatively rigid and fixed masses, moving in space almost totally free of inertia and impeding matter, and the interaction of their gravitational fields place them in constant relation to one another.[12] Given knowledge of the laws of ineraction of the universe, and given a set of known constants, it is possible to make relatively accurate predictions about the positions of the planets vis-à-vis one another. Astronomy is probably the only currently known system for which the requirements of the Newtonian paradigm hold. The relatively accurate predictability of the universe employing the Newtonian model as a first approximation disappears when applied to meteorology, where,

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[11] Egon Brunswick, Perception and the Representative Design in Psychological Experiments (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956).

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[12] Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1962), p. 32.

> The number of particles concerned is so enormous that an accurate record of their initial positions and velocities is utterly impossible. . . . Using the Newtonian laws, or any other system of laws whatever, all that we can predict at any future time is a probability distribution of constants of the system, and even this predictability fades out with increases in time.[13]

It should be obvious that all of the social sciences fall near the meteorology end of the continuum.

Social Sources

The narrowing effects of socialization on content of belief systems. Every man is socially encapsulated, in the sense that his personal primitive beliefs and models of empirical reality derive from processes quite independent of any absolute or universal truth. A human being is affected continually from birth by the socialization stimuli emitted by a variety of primary and secondary settings. Every non-scientific perceptual system is limited because each is the product of a different, and in some instances a unique, frame of reference. The content of socialization stimuli may vary greatly, which means, of course, that the cognitive instruments of the personality will also vary greatly; the possible sources of variation include culture, nation, social class, occupation, race, religion, political and associational affiliations, section, city or town, neighborhood and family. The proliferation of factors which shape the cognitive components of the personality almost automatically assures deep disagreement over values and perception of reality. While a particular perceptual system may be both correct and congruent to the frame of reference which shaped it, it is likely to be rejected as incorrect when generalized to an incongruent frame of reference or to a wider range of settings. The rejection as false of a competing value system or empirical model of reality by the members of an incongruent frame of reference is a function of the simple confrontation of two parochial and narrow or limited cognitive belief systems. Where such confrontations occur, the truth or falsity of one or the other of the belief systems is irrelevant: neither is correct outside the frame of reference which shaped it. Thus, all values (primitive belief systems) and perceptions (empirical models of reality) are relative, even though the people who hold them tend to assume that they are true absolutely and universally. To the observer of belief systems, they are all equally inaccurate when generalized beyond the congruent frame of reference.

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[13] *Ibid*., p. 33.

If the personal belief systems people hold are exclusively a function of the accidental or random configuration of stimuli in a socialization environment, and if the narrowness of the configurations are sufficient to limit the application of these belief systems to the frames of reference that shaped them, then it follows that the explicit or implicit reliance on such beliefs in the process of general social inquiry guarantees that the knowledge derived will be fraught with bias and misconception. Parochial belief systems always yield limited and incomplete approximations of general reality. Yet those who engage in social inquiry are continually forced to rely upon their own subjective primitive beliefs and models of reality as points of reference and departure for scientific investigation. After all, they must be able to ask questions in order to get answers, and the ability to ask questions depends upon the prior existence of a conceptual language: this language is invariably the one acquired during the process of socialization. The effect of epistemologies and primitive beliefs on the kinds of questions asked can be demonstrated by comparing the two epistemological maincurrents of Occidental society: the Aristotelian and the

Galileian.[14] The first and oldest, and outside the physical sciences the most honored is the Aristotelian, which symbolizes behavior as a function of essence, or _telos_. Or, schematically

$$b = f\ (e).$$

All things, including human beings, do what their essences dictate, leaving the obvious implication that the kind and direction of physical vector followed by an organism or an object is determined in advance of its existence. The cause of activity along a vector is an authorized or "good" force. Translated into the language of modern social science, this means _normal_. Aristotelian laws of behavior are established statistically by observing frequency distributions, the touchstone of frequency being regularity. Events that are infrequent or fail to fit the model of the normal curve established statistically, are classified as _chance_, and therefore _unique_. Because essence determines behavior, there is little need to examine the environment as a changing source of stimuli that may affect changes in behavior.

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[14] Kurt Lewin, _A Dynamic Theory of Personality_ (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935), Chapter 1.

According to the Galileian frame of reference, behavior is a function of the interaction of units, or,

$$b = f\ (u_1/u_2).$$

The events of reality are seen as a comprehensive, "all-embracing unity,"[15] governed by laws that influence the outcome of a variety of seemingly different kinds of interaction. Unique events are not chance after all--they simply operate according to as yet undiscovered laws or are a function of conditional variation in existing laws. The study of environmental conditions as they affect the laws of behavior, and therefore behavioral outcomes, becomes critical. As Lewin states

> The situation assumes as much importance as the object. _Only by the concrete whole which comprises the object and the situation are the vectors which determine the dynamics of the event defined_.[16]

The differences between the two epistemologies reveal some interesting implications for the relationship between concept formation, classification and measurement. The classificatory paradigm for the Aristotelian frame of reference is the valuative dichotomy: (1) political systems are classified as either "good" or "perverted"; (2) the "good" form of rule by the many is a polity and the "perverted" form is democracy; (3) reason is dichotomized between the perfect form (contemplation) and the imperfect form (practical reason or moral virtue). Even where a trichotomy inadvertently creeps into the analysis, there is a latent bias toward the adoption of exclusively discrete, qualitative variables. The Galileian frame, in contrast, exhibits a preference for continuous, quantitative, and definitely objective variables. The continuous variable spreads the dichotomy out and makes refinement possible in the form of increments or gradients. Discrete variables are easily treated statistically in terms of proportions, rank order correlations and multivariate analysis employing contingency tables. But continuous variables extend the range of statistical techniques to simple and multiple regression and correlation analysis. By adding the continuous variable, the Galileian frame expands the power of the scientific method for refining observation and analysis.

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[15] _Ibid_., p. 10.

[16] _Ibid_., pp. 29-30. (Italics in original.)

Pathology Scholarship

Possibly the best example of the intrusion of the Aristotelian epistemology in political science can be found in the area of study characterized by Robert Lane as "the pathologies of democratic man."[17] The pathologies include loss of identity, self-alienation, anxiety, lack of self-control, irrationality, anti-intraception, misanthropy, constricted empathy, closed ego, the we-they syndrome, conformity, social alienation, anomie, cynicism, constricted univalue systems, traditionalism and authoritarianism. The identification of the pathologies is based on the conviction that they encourage the "dangerous" oligarchical tendencies latent in political life, and discourage the attainment of man's perfect state, perfect political equality. Any research aimed specifically at the discovery of pathology assumes normality, and the unexamined normality premise of the pathology scholars has been acceptance of classical democracy as a verified description of reality. The key propositions of classical democracy hold that man is, in his natural state, good, rational, equal and free; that the many are the only legitimate source of power and majority rule the only legitimate technique of policy; that all conflicts can be resolved by persuasion. The pathologies are seen as the perverse symptoms of man's corruption by the manipulative chauvinism of the politician; eliminate the pathologies and man will revert to his perfect state, and there will be a residual flowering of the perfect political system in the form of a mass participation polyarchy.

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[17] Robert Lane, Political Ideology (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 400-412.

The abrasive and unpalatable fact which the pathology scholars have been unable to face is that classical democracy or polyarchy is nothing more than a political myth, conveniently maintained (in the United States at least) by the ruling class to give the polity enough support to guarantee its survival without risking the involvement of the unsophisticated masses in the complex world of power politics. For example, much is made of the effect of the pathologies on limiting the use of the franchise, the implication being that one who does not vote is somehow abnormal--political participation is a natural instinct. But a decision not to vote can be based on very sound judgment, especially where the voter believes in having "a choice, not an echo," but finds no differentiation in the programs or candidates of the two parties. If a voter can see no differences in the programs or candidates, he may rightly infer that his vote will not affect outcomes. It can also be argued that a very high proportion of the electorate in a competitive democracy must remain either unaligned or uninvolved in order to give the party that lost the last election some hope of winning the next. For example, political competition in the deep South was practically nonexistent until 1964, when the Republican Party was able to break the traditional voting habits of segregationists by exploiting the hostility toward the Democratic Party for its sponsorship of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Because such changes occur infrequently, a polity in which all eligible voters were registered, in which all voted traditional commitments, and where one party had a relatively large majority, say 60% of the vote, would exhibit few tendencies toward party competition. The losing party would simply have no incentive strong enough to evoke competition. In the absence of independents, apathetics and cross-over voters, the losing party would have no reason to field an organization for the next election; if this situation occurred often it would eventually lead to the disappearance of the two-party system.

The fossilization of knowledge due to the institutionalization of competing epistemologies, theories and methodologies. Cognitive instruments find longevity within the matrix of the social exchange process, where symbols, definitions and doctrines are continually paired with important physical and emotional values. The cognitive instruments which gain the most frequent support of the greatest number of valued primary, conditioned and generalized reinforcers automatically have the highest probability of being transmitted, internalized and maintained. Because value patterns develop enduring structures of allocation called institutions, the cognitive artifacts woven into the lattice of the institution frequently become as resistant to change as the institution itself. This is as true of academic disciplines and the knowledge they create and transmit as of any other institutional arrangement in society. Particular epistemologies, theories and methodologies become invested with wealth, prestige, respect, authority and the inertia of an institutional framework. Within psychology, for example, there exist six different, major systems (cosmologies), and perhaps as many as twenty-five specific theoretical approaches.[18] Psychology departments, like other academic departments, tend to organize around particular approaches and theories. The Aristotelian epistemology still clings tenaciously in psychoanalysis, trait psychology and motivationism. Its influence in political science has been the result of a heavy borrowing, during the early stages of behavioral development[19] from the more primitive disciplines of psychology and the resistance of the powerful humanities bloc, notably history and literature, to change. Even in the face of the massive Galileian revolution in the social sciences, there is almost no evidence that the Aristotelian disciplines are assimilating the concepts, theories and methods of the new epistemology. There seems to be instead a bureaucratic preference for maintaining the traditional notions by allowing the Galileian disciplines to develop informal or semi-autonomous institutions. The process of evolution that purged the Aristotelian frame of reference from physics has been halted in the social sciences by allowing the more powerful (powerful in the sense of the practical value of the knowledge created) Galileian competitors to develop parallel, but uncompetitive systems. The new behavioral (Galileian) disciplines have been uncompetitive because of the absence, in any of the major academic disciplines, of corporate techniques for the warranty of knowledge. The new approach can be taught anywhere it can gain a hearing, and no matter what the scope of the hearing, it cannot affect the older approaches. Parallel development is partly the result of the modern explosion in higher education. Demand for trained academicians is so great and opportunities so proliferate, that the new and old rarely meet. Most collisions are oblique, and avoidable. In any other value situation, especially one of greater scarcity, the older approaches would have to fight it out to the death. The cumulative result has been a continual proliferation of epistemologies, theories and methodologies safely enshrined in the legitimacy of an academic discipline. It has become easier and easier for students to select academic programs that reinforce rather than challenge their parochial, personal belief systems; the personal ideology becomes invested with the magic of academic authority and is able to subsequently ward off all contradictory interpretations of reality.

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[18] Melvin Marx and William Hillix, Systems and Theories in Psychology (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963).

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[19] Note Harold Lasswell's Power and Personality (New York: W. W. Norton, 1948) and Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930). The "behavioral uprising" of the Chicago School, though it lacked many of the more unfortunate methodological errors of Aristotelian historicism, was nevertheless explicitly interested in the pathologies of democratic man.

CHAPTER II

THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR

Epistemic Requirements

According to William P. McEwen,

> The social scientist, as well as the natural scientist, can operationally construct reliable hypotheses about that dimension of reality with which he is concerned, in terms of a coherent system of generalizations which have causal implications that can be verified to various degrees of probability.[1]

McEwen believes that this statement entails acceptance of five epistemological postulates about the nature of scientific inquiry: (a) the existence of dimensions of reality which parallel the subjective constructs of academic disciplines, (b) the need for treating social phenomena probabilistically, (c) the need for an orderly system of constructs for approximating dimensions, (d) the "requiredness" of causality as "the principle of objective reference for the construction of explanatory and predictive hypotheses . . . ," (e) the need for coherence as "the generic logical criterion of verification. . . ."[2] If epistemologies determine the questions asked of reality and if the questions shape the answers, then it follows that the most critical stage of the process of social inquiry is the first. Thus, before we may deal with an epistemology of human behavior, we must settle on the methodological requirements that will shape it. McEwen's postulates provide a framework into which the conclusions implicit in the foregoing analysis can be poured:

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[1] William P. McEwen, The Problem of Social Scientific Knowledge (Totowa, New Jersey: Bedminster Press, 1963), p. 238.

> 1) There is an objective reality to a specific dimension of which the subjective constructs of the particular discipline refer.[3]

Among other things, this statement places primary emphasis upon the existence of the observer-observed partition. It also validates the assumption that each of the social scientific disciplines has, in some broad sense, captured a particular dimension of reality. However, the orientation of this work is toward integration of the social sciences, as well as the synthesis of the micro and macro levels of human activity.

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[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

> 2) A high degree of probability (reasonable acceptability), rather than absolute certainty, is the most that can be expected in the operational verification of generalizations which never exhaust all that is yet to be known.[4]

Acceptance of a Bergsonian, as opposed to a Newtonian, frame of reference, requires probabilistic treatment of social phenomena.

> 3) Knowledge about the objective physical and behavioral universe requires an orderly system of constructs.[5]

This means that whatever theory is eventually derived be relatively _closed_, and that it provide for the interaction of a limited number of analytically related and defined constructs. In terms of specific requirements, the system constructed must be _dynamic_, must assume _evolution_ and must be _Galileian_ in its allocation of constructs.

> 4) The category of causality is required as the principle of objective reference for the construction of explanatory and predictive hypotheses about the interaction of physical and behavioral events.[6]

Not only causality but _multiple causation_ in particular, is assumed. The emergent, or integrated system, of necessity must be capable of representing the inherent _complexity_ of social phenomena. Acceptance of _evolution_ requires preparation for the emergence of _new_, perhaps unique relationships; it also requires an open-minded or provisional view of reality. Whatever the resulting theory, it must be capable of revision.

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[4] _Ibid_. [5] _Ibid_. [6] _Ibid_.

> 5) Coherence (consistency and adequacy) is the generic logical criterion of verification from which the specific criteria for empirically testing the deduced implication of hypotheses are derived.[7]

This formulation constitutes one of the central techniques to be employed in the building of our theory. Since few real empirical tests will be available, we shall be forced to rely constantly on the consistency and adequacy factors for determining which theoretical formulations to accept and which to reject.

The epistemic model of behavior to be elaborated in this chapter will be selectively woven out of the strands provided by a set of untested, but inherently plausible empirical propositions. They are "inherently plausible" because they are derivations from a corpus of existing evidence about human behavior. They are "untested" because they have been derived inductively from several different universes of inquiry and research. One distinct advantage of beginning the process of inquiry with an accumulated body of descriptive evidence is that one need not rely upon subjectively limited propositions deduced from a personal, perhaps primitive belief system. The basic formula for human behavior adopted here is Galileian:

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[7] *Ibid.*

$$b = f\ (o/e),$$

or behavior is a function of the interaction of the organism with its environment. This is the basic relationship out of which the macro and micro components of behavior systems evolve. The nature of the organism makes it highly susceptible to shaping by environmental stimuli initially; once a personality has evolved, the organism may begin to have a decided impact on the alteration of the environment. The elementary (micro) processes of both shaping and exchange give rise to novel, or aggregate outcomes (macro). The slash between the organism and environment represents the partition between the observer and the observed, assuring a central place in the epistemology to the problems of human knowledge described in the previous chapter, as well as the cognitive techniques evolved by man to resolve them.

The formula requires that our empirical postulates be divided between the units of interaction: the organism and the environment. Thus,

The Organism:

All human operant activity (and some respondent activity) is motivated by a desire to acquire values.

All of the premises upon which activity is based, and the components through which it is processed (except for biogenic and neurogenic needs), are learned.

All human activity is affected by a concern for efficiency and rationality.

Every component of the human personality performs a function for the organism (and for society).

The Environment:

All values are scarce.

Values have a widespread, but uneven distribution.

Before exploring each postulate in detail, what do they imply as a collectivity?

A Model of Development

In a sequential sense, it seems rather obvious from the geological record that the environment preceded the existence of the organisms which inhabit it. Man is the end product of a continuous struggle of vertebrates against a relatively fixed and often hostile environment. Evolution